- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
34
- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
Ricky Mondello (@rmondello@hachyderm.io)
hachyderm.ioIf you actually read the “Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them.” post going around, you’ll find a transparent attempt to clumsily string together a conspiracy.
The post is predicated on the idea that a feature of WebAuthn called “attestation”, which is only used in high-assurance and usually corporate scenarios, and usually with physical hardware security keys, will be leveraged to hurt people, somehow.
The post posits that a website like X will bait and switch users: first, you get a passkey. Then, later, scary “attested” passkeys! This simply isn’t possible to do because attestation isn’t supported on the web for mass market, consumer authentication.
Attestation for passkeys (software-based, syncable credentials) is antithetical to their mass market goals, and would freeze out independent, non-corporate-backed credential managers. It’s an explicit non-goal of the designers of passkeys, who work together in a forum anyone can join.
And trust me, websites and apps like banks repeatedly asked for attestation at the beginning of the industry’s passkey journey. The platforms, browsers, and credential management apps have held firm that the goal of passkeys is reducing phishing and **not** some kind of trusted computing scheme. (And I will note: over my dead body!)
Besides the theory of the case being fundamentally wrong, there are several things that make the post disqualifying in terms of arguing something useful or important in the realm of security, privacy, and user authentication:
1. Intentionally presenting things that are complicated as inherently suspicious. (Delivering security by design can be complicated, yes!)
2. Describing TOTP as a “great solution” for adding security to a password-based account. When the most common threat model on the web is phishing (a word the post never mentions!), TOTP hardly buys you _anything_. TOTP is phishable.
3. Seeming to be unbothered by how many logical leaps are being taken without actually understanding the topic being discussed.
There are bad things happening in tech and untrustworthy people and companies do exist, but they’re largely in the AI space, not the “let’s stop people we love from getting compromised through phishing” space.
Crossposted from https://feddit.org/post/36692057
A rebuttal to an anti-passkey, pro-TOTP post that has made the rounds on Lemmy as well.


How do you phish someone’s TOTP?
If you’re asking that question you’re probably already at lower risk. Just think of scammers calling up your grandparents or something like that; they pretend to be Microsoft, ask for the user’s credentials, attempt to sign in, then ask for the user’s one time passcode. You can get more elaborate setups but that’s the gist.
Ah, I see. The point is no one can ask for your passkey, right?
Exactly, you can’t easily share the passkeys to anyone so it should be impossible without an exploit.
Fairly easily if you create a good replica of the original website the user is trying to log in to.
In a lot of cases, even technically savvy people are not going to verify the URL.
I see. I use a password manager so it would probably not fill in the password or the TOTP and throw a red flag for me.
The phishing attack could also try to convince you your bank had changed domains (hey we’ve been bought by Big Bank and will be moving your account to BigBank.com) and therefore not to expect your password manager to autofill (this is a stretch I know).
Passkeys are resistant to phishing as they cannot be replayed and your authenticator should refuse challenges from the wrong domain. Even if it did solve a challenge from bigbank.com it’s worthless as the origin is included in the returned challenge so cannot be used by the attackers on the real bank site.
That wouldn’t work with the iOS passwords app, since Autofill breaks all the time…
Worksonmymachine.md
Call them, say you are the bank and they have seen fraudulent transactions, and to restore the account they will send you a code which you have to tell them…
For the sms codes: it’s also pretty easy to copy/clone a sim
There is also the option of a MITM attack with a portal that forwards the login to the real login page and then cuts your connection and the MITM has the open session.
The good thing with passkeys is, there is nothing a fraudster can get from a user. You can’t forward your passkey via the phone, and MITM are much, much harder to pull off
I was more referring to “authenticator” style codes. I dunno what else to call them. But you answered that as well.
Evilnginx has existed for almost a decade to get totp codes.